Race and Affirmative Action in “Post-Racial” Democratic Brazil by Vazquez Baur, Alejandra T
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2017
Race and Affirmative Action in “Post-Racial”
Democratic Brazil
Alejandra T. Vazquez Baur
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vazquez Baur, Alejandra T., "Race and Affirmative Action in “Post-Racial” Democratic Brazil" (2017). CMC Senior Theses. 1702.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1702
 
 
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
 
Race and Affirmative Action in “Post-Racial” Democratic Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alejandra T. Vázquez Baur 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
Professor William Ascher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for 
 
Senior Thesis 
Spring 2017 
April 24, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the ways that Brazilians are evaluated for their privileges in 
qualification for the affirmative action program.  It critically examines the existing 
policies, how they function, and how they affect ideas of race in Brazil for both black and 
non-black Brazilians.  Additionally, it proposes that the policies prioritize phenotype as a 
primary condition for qualifying for a quota in order to accomplish their initial objectives 
of fighting racial inequalities, compensating for historical injustices, contributing to the 
diversity of experiences and perspectives on campuses and in federal offices, and raising 
understanding of what it means to be black in Brazil. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Often called “the third root,” Afrolatinos are frequently left out of the history of 
Latin America.  The well-known story paints Latin America as a biracial region, 
originally inhabited by Native Americans and colonized by Iberian Europeans.  This 
version of history, which highlights mestizaje and undermines the significant influence of 
“la tercera raiz,” dilutes the fullness that is Latino culture, life and society.  More than 
150 million Afro-descendants live throughout Latin America, contributing to the 
political, economic and social development of almost all countries in Central and South 
America and the Caribbean.   Additionally, and perhaps as an explanation for their 
invisibility, Afrolatinos are most often the poorest and most marginalized within their 
respective countries.  Of the entire population of Brazil, 46 percent self-identifies as 
Afro-Brazilian, but they constitute over 65 percent of the lowest socioeconomic class.  
Additionally, only 18 percent of Afro-Brazilians have completed secondary school 
(Ribando Seelke 2008, 5).  Other countries in Latin America are similar.  In Colombia, an 
estimated 11 percent of the population self-identifies as Afro-Colombian, though experts 
suggest that the real proportion is much greater.  Regardless, they agree that nearly 80 
percent of Afro-Colombians live in extreme poverty, 74 percent earn less than minimum 
wage, and only four percent attend university (Ribando Seelke 2008, 5).  Venezuela, 
which does not collect census data based on race, has similar proportions; the two lowest 
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social sectors make up ~60 percent of the total population, and 64.2 percent of 
Venezuelans identify as non-white (Cannon 2008, 737).   
These countries are home to some of the largest communities of Afro-descendents 
in the Americas, and statistics show similar patterns of intersectionality1 among lower 
income groups and communities of color (indigenous, mixed race and Afro-descendents).  
Additional problematic and highly visible characteristics include continuing poverty 
among the lower socioeconomic classes and communities of color, low education rates, 
high crime rates particularly in areas where these communities live, and growing racial 
polarization.  Why do Latin America’s communities of color experience such inequality?  
How have Latin American governments sought to govern multi-racial countries, create 
opportunities for communities of color, and mitigate the racial and ethnic tensions within 
them?  What does this mean for the future of pluralism and racial democracies in Latin 
America and around the world?   
Brazil, the largest country as well as the largest economy in Latin America, is 
often represented positively when it comes to race issues due to its famed ideology of a 
“racial democracy,” which claims that Brazil overcame racial discrimination as a result of 
miscegenation.  This ideology creates a racial color-continuum that neglects the 
distinctiveness of Afro-Brazilians in the global context.  Additionally, as mentioned 
above, statistics show that Afro-Brazilians experience extreme disparities in income, 
health, and education.  However, there are also negative stereotypes associated with 
blackness in Brazil that have shaped the way mixed-race and Afro-Brazilians self-
                                                
1 The interconnected nature of social categorizations such as race, class, and gender as they apply to a 
given individual or group, regarded as creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination 
or disadvantage. 
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identify with their African heritage, leading to their invisibility in national statistics as 
well (Caldwell 2007, 5). 
Beginning with a number of state-supported efforts to combat these inequities in 
2004, policy-makers created a federal affirmative action policy – called the Law of Social 
Quotas – for public universities in 2012 that requires that they reserve a significant 
portion of their admission slots for self-identifying Afro-Brazilians.  Francis and Tannuri-
Pianto reveals that self-identification as preto (black) increased significantly in 
applications across Brazil, revealing the rising incentive to self-identify as such.  She also 
found that many Brazilians below the margin of pardo (brown) and preto began 
misrepresenting their identities reversely, claiming more blackness than was necessary in 
order to receive the benefits afforded by the affirmative action program.  The increase in 
quota applications forced universities to begin interviewing quota applicants to determine 
which students were “black enough” to qualify, both on the basis of the shade of their 
skin and their socioeconomic background and experiences.  The interviews, thus, 
provided the opportunity for subjective judgments by the university without a clear set of 
criteria for exactly which students should receive the benefits.  Secondly, as has been 
found in many affirmative action cases in the United States, Brazilian universities have 
struggled to fill all of the available racial quota seats and continue supporting quota 
students following their acceptance and ensuring their success throughout their education.  
Statistics show that quota students have a difficult time keeping up with their more 
privileged branco (white) peers due to a lack of prior opportunities.  Furthermore, the 
adoption of affirmative action policies in universities and later in federal government 
departments does not solely solve society-wide poverty for Afro-Brazilians as a whole.   
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 Other countries in Latin America have implemented different policies for 
combating racial disparity.  In Venezuela, even years after the enslavement and 
appropriation of black labor, society still functions under a white-Eurocentric norm that 
stigmatizes indigenous and black peoples and relegates them to the lower income classes 
of society.  Afro-Venezuelans received no special health or education benefits before and 
throughout the puntofijo era (1958-1989) by virtue of their ethnicity, and they still make 
up the majority of the lower class (Cannon 2008, 741).  Therefore it is no wonder that 
when a common, poor man of color campaigned for the presidency on a populist/socialist 
platform, Venezuela experienced a revolution.  Chavez’s win was a “win for the people”, 
for “el pueblo”2.  Using race and class as central pieces to his political rhetoric, Chavez 
likened himself to the majority of Venezuelans – which validated black and indigenous 
identity across Venezuela – and won the vote with a promise “‘to beat those ominous 
phenomen[a] such as racism’” (741).  His policy initiatives in education, health, food 
salaries, employment, land, and identity sought to bring light to the “existence of class 
and race fractures in Venezuelan society” (743).  He enacted a number of social 
programming and improvement misiones.  Scholars argue, however, that while Chavez 
channeled government benefits to the poor communities of color, the policies were 
ineffective in making genuine changes in the larger structural problem.  Furthermore, his 
policies are criticized for further deepening racial and class rifts in Venezuela, reducing 
overall governance and lack of a unified Venezuelan identity.  
 While there is a lack of educational initiatives for ethnic minorities in Colombia, 
the country has attempted other strategies for remedying its history.  Multiple Afro-
                                                
2 Spanish term used colloquially in Venezuela and across Latin America to mean “the people” 
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Colombian social movements mobilized and gained momentum during the 1980s, 
particularly as a response to increased action in neighboring countries and international 
pressures from the human rights community.  During the phase of “political opening” 
across Latin America, Colombia saw the emergence of multiple Afro-centric NGOs that 
saw to the reformation of the Constitution (which, until 1991, failed to recognize the 
cultural and ethnic diversity of Colombia) – a contrast to what we have seen in the 
Brazilian and Venezuelan cases.  The official adoption of multicultural policies and 
amendments to Colombia’s Constitution in 1991 legitimized the existence and identity of 
indigenous and black communities.  While organizations were not formally deemed Afro-
Colombian before the amendments, they were explicitly deemed so following, and 
organizations began to change their official names to include terms like “Afro” or 
“Black/Negro”.  Most significant of these policies is Law 70, which Paschel and Sawyer 
argue was the catalyst that brought together Afro-Colombian activists from different 
regions to begin “consolidat[ing] a national Black identity” (Paschel and Sawyer 2008, 
209) that is present to this day.  The Law “institutionalizes racial quotas … and grants 
Afro-Colombians collective land rights” (208).  Analysts have found, however, that the 
final version of Law 70 looks nothing like the initial plan that Afro-Colombian activists 
advocated.  Rather, the land grants are small and geographically specified to mostly rural 
areas, consequently segregating Colombian people by race and, thus, marginalizing Afro-
Colombians.  Furthermore, while the amendments have helped to consolidate ethnic and 
national group identity, they fail to keep the government accountable for retrenchment 
and significant human rights violations against Afro-Colombian communities. 
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These are three examples of Latin American countries that have implemented 
policies to attempt to improve conditions for their racial minorities.  In the case of 
Venezuela, Chavez invoked ethnic differences for political prowess during his campaign, 
but his policies only address income distribution, leaving race out of their prescription.  
Colombian policies, on the other hand, have neither invoked racial difference nor 
established any sort of affirmative action policy for Afro-Colombians to excel 
academically.  Brazil is the only country in Latin America that has formalized a race-
based affirmative action policy.  Therefore, going in-depth about Brazil, which is further 
along compared to other countries in formally examining its problematic history of 
slavery, helps to clarify the issue of race and inequality across Latin America.  Brazil can 
serve as a cautionary tale for other Latin American countries that confront and mitigate 
their internal race and ethnic complications.   
This thesis aims to examine the effectiveness of Brazil’s affirmative action policy, 
weigh the merits of self-identification tied to ancestry versus strictly phenotypic 
characteristics as criteria for racial quota designation, as well as examine the attitudes of 
non-black Brazilians towards their Afro-Brazilian counterparts.   
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Terminology 
Before the analysis, it might be helpful to discuss the terminology commonly used 
throughout this thesis.  Latin American Studies scholars use numerous terms throughout 
their articles, many of which are in Spanish or Portuguese (and written in italics) or are 
influenced by either of the two languages.  Policy sciences scholars also use a vocabulary 
that might require clarification.  Additionally, it might be helpful to explain these terms 
as I understand and use them and in terms of their significance particularly to this thesis.  
An important term to explore first is ‘governability’.  According to J. Kooiman, 
governability can be defined as: “The overall capacity for governance of any societal 
entity or system” (Kooiman 2008, 173).  In most contexts, governability connotes control 
and is interpreted negatively.  The way I choose to interpret and use governability is by 
its rawest pedigree, defined above by Kooiman, as a way to measure the success of three 
variables: the governing body, the governed peoples, and the interactions between the 
two (Kooiman 2008, 173).  In the concluding sentence of the preceding paragraph, I 
referred to the purpose of this thesis as assessing the governability of racially diverse 
countries in Latin America, and in particular, their interactions with their significant 
Afro-populations.  Therefore, in my analysis, I hope to examine affirmative action and 
additional race policies as they are implemented to combat the inequities experienced by 
Afrolatinos.   
 Another important term to understand for the purpose of this thesis is 
‘intersectionality’.  Dr. Kathy Davis of Utrecht University defines intersectionality as 
“the interaction of multiple identities and experiences of exclusion and subordination” 
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(Davis 2008, 67).  Originally coined during the feminist movement, intersectionality is 
useful because it refers to the interaction of many categories, including gender, race, 
class, and others as they affect individuals’ experiences.  Though an important aspect of 
the issue involves the role that women of color play in shaping and holding together their 
communities and how they experience those same stereotypes in a very different way, in 
this thesis, the use of intersectionality will often reference the crossover between race and 
class.  This is where traditional uses of the term from feminist theory will be useful.  
Understanding intersectionality is crucial to the argument – that Afrolatinos experience a 
distinctive and underprivileged life in Latin America due equally to both race and class. 
  Mestizaje/mestiçagem3 and mulatez are quintessential terms used regularly by 
Latin American scholars in discourse regarding identity.  Martinez-Echazabal defines 
mestizaje as “the process of interracial and/or intercultural mixing … particularly in those 
areas colonized by the Spanish and the Portuguese” (Martinez-Echazabal 1998, 21).  
Because of Latin America’s complicated history of colonialism, indigenous and African 
slavery, and mass immigration, “mixing” is essentially at the core of its existence.   
Additionally, mestizaje is fundamental to Latin American (and particularly Brazilian) 
identity, circulating originally during the period of national consolidation across Latin 
America as a nationalization tactic.  Modern connotations of mestizaje encompass any 
and all hybrid identities existing in Latin America, such as Mexican Jews, Japanese 
                                                
3 Mestizaje (Spanish) often translates to Portuguese as miscigenação or mesiçagem and to English as 
miscegenation.  The latter terms limit our perception of mixedness as only the sexual relationship or 
marriage between two people of different races.  In Spanish-speaking Latin America, however, the term 
“mestizaje” is used to describe the state of mixedness, of being of two or more races, and people who 
identify as such call themselves mestizo/a.  When we look at this idea of “mixing” in this thesis, we will 
more often than not consider mixedness as an identity for one or many people rather than a type of 
relationship between just two people.  For this reason, I use mestizaje – a more diverse and comprehensive 
translation – throughout the thesis instead of the equivalent Portuguese and English terms. 
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Brazilians, and Chinese Peruvians to name a few, and are not limited to the traditional 
Indigenous - European identity most commonly associated with Latin America.  
This thesis will focus on mulatez, a specific type of mestizaje.  Mulatez is a term 
that represents African-European hybridization and “has been treated as a signifier of 
what many consider a racial and/or ethnic ontological condition – that of being mulatto – 
a condition often ascribed to individuals, groups, and national cultures whose ‘character’ 
is drawn from the notion of [Sub-Saharan] African and European miscegenation” 
(Martinez-Echazabal 1998, 22).  This identity in particular has been crucial to the cultural 
development of a number of countries in Latin America with high proportions of 
Afrolatinos, particularly the Caribbean and the three countries being analyzed in this 
thesis.  Therefore, these two terms will show up throughout the thesis in reference to the 
identities significant to this study. 
Also extremely important in the history and literature of Afro-Latin America is 
the theory of ‘whitening’ (blanqueamiento in Spanish and embranquecimento in 
Portuguese4).  In contrast with the United States, where racial mixing was discouraged 
and even outlawed5, throughout the Caribbean and Brazil in particular, miscegenation 
was encouraged by the country’s elites as a way to “civilize” the people.  Brazilian 
lawyer and historian F. J. Oliveira Vianna analyzed multiple years’ worth of census 
statistics and compared the gradual whitening of Brazil to “Aryanization,” suggesting that 
                                                
4 I will be using the Spanish and Portuguese terms wherever appropriate throughout my thesis.  For 
example, if I am writing about the concept of whitening as it functions in Brazil, I will reference the term 
‘embranquecimento,’ and when talking about whitening in Colombia and Venezuela, I will use the term 
‘blanqueamiento’. 
5 A number of laws across the colonies and later the United States outlawed miscegenation and interracial 
marriage.  These laws were not officially and totally repealed until the Supreme Court Case Loving v. 
Virginia ruled unanimously in favor of the legal marriage of one interracial couple in Virginia.  This set the 
precedent for all interracial marriages henceforth, that “the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations” (Loving v. Virginia, 1967).   
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Brazil was reaching “ethnic purity by miscegenation” (Skidmore 1974, 202; cited in 
Caldwell 2007, 30).  Census statistics report the same trends in Colombia and Venezuela 
as well due to false self-identification.  Blanqueamiento is especially relevant to the 
development of these nations whose elites used this concept as “a middle ground between 
European theories of racial determinism and [Latin American] social realities” (Caldwell 
2007, 30) in order to build an acceptable social hierarchy with Afro-descendants at the 
bottom and white elites on top.  Blanqueamiento is what sets the Latin American case 
apart from the North American case and a theory whose long-term social consequences 
will be examined extensively in this thesis. 
 Additional Portuguese terms useful for understanding how Brazilians identify are 
branco, preto, and pardo.  Branco (Portuguese) translates to “white” in English, and this 
is a term particularly used to describe or identify a fair-skinned person or someone of 
European descent.  Preto means “black” (the color), and is used to describe or identify a 
very dark-skinned person or someone of African descent – not to be confused with negro, 
which translates to “black” with the American connotation, and refers to a social 
grouping of individuals of African descent not counting typically African phenotypic 
features, versus preto which simply refers to skin tone.  Pardo means “brown,” but it is 
often used to mean “mixed,” as it is colloquially used to identify a person who is of 
mixed descent (any combination of European, indigenous, and African descent).  Pardos 
are typically medium-skinned, though pardo is incredibly common because of high 
miscegenation in Brazil, and thus can be any person with a skin tone between pale white 
and very dark.  Pardo and mulatto can be used interchangeably, though it seems that 
12 
 
pardo is the more contemporary term, and mulatto was more often used throughout the 
twentieth century. 
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Chapter II: History of Race in Brazil 
 
Brazil has a long history of colonialism, slavery, nationalism and imperialism, all 
which helped to construct and maintain the racial inequalities affirmative action hopes to 
resolve.  In discussing race and racism in national contexts, as Caldwell says, it is 
important to see them as “culturally and historically specific phenomena” (Caldwell 
1971, 9) that manifest and construct themselves in particular ways.  This chapter will 
explore the history of Brazil and how this history has conditioned the racial disparities 
witnessed today.   
 
*** 
 
Brazil is often the first country scholars look to for guidance on multi-racial 
issues.  Entire books, theses and dissertations attempt to explain the Brazilian case, 
characterized by a path beginning with mass shipments of millions of Africans during the 
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade to Freyre’s twentieth century theories of “Luso-tropicalism” 
and “racial democracy” that still play significant roles in the way Brazilians view 
identity, nationalism and race.   
According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, between 1501 and 1875 – 
the entire period of the slave trade leading up to Brazil’s official abolition in 1888 – 
3,189,262 slaves disembarked ships from West Africa to a future of field and urban labor 
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and enslavement in what would later become Brazil6.  This was approximately 37 percent 
of the total number of slaves disembarked in the New World during the slave trade7.  This 
statistic is significant because it shows the sheer demand for labor in Brazil throughout 
this period as Portuguese colonizers established an export economy of the natural 
resources found throughout Brazil.  Slaves were used to tend expansive sugar plantations 
in the Northeast, mine gold and diamonds in the West, herd cattle ranches in the South, 
and run coffee plantations in the Center-South (Skidmore 1972, 6).  By the nineteenth 
century, slaves were used as urban servants as cities expanded and industrialization took 
over Brazil, bringing millions of immigrants from all over the world.  Of the many 
various groups that immigrated to Brazil from the sixteenth century until today, African 
slaves have always been relegated to the bottom of the Brazilian social hierarchy.    
Abolition was a gradual process in Brazil.  The first written law in 1871 granted 
freedom to the children of slave mothers.  Fourteen years later, in 1885, a new law 
emancipated slaves of older than 60 years of age.  It was not until 1888 that total 
abolition was passed across Brazil, granting slaves freedom despite age or parentage and 
without compensation for slave owners.   
Throughout the latter 19th Century, the population of freed Afro-Brazilians 
increased exponentially so that by 1872, free Afro-Brazilians made up 42 percent of the 
total population of Brazil (Skidmore 1972, 2).  Contrary to popular belief, as more black 
Brazilians were given freedom from enslavement, traditional theories of Brazilian social 
hierarchy did not change, and in fact, racialized behavior increased.  Free Afro-Brazilians 
                                                
6 The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database: Table, Row 25 yr period, Column Regions of disembarkment, 
Cells sum of disembarked slaves;  http://slavevoyages.org/voyage/search 
7 The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, ibid. 
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found themselves entering into a social system that viewed them in the same light as 
when they were enslaved, only now given a different title.  As a result of this, it is 
important to note the increasing relevance of phenotype in post-colonial Brazilian 
society.  Physical characteristics such as skin tone, hair texture, and facial characteristics 
helped to distinguish white Brazilians from non-white Brazilians, and mulattos from 
pretos.  These physical distinctions were supported by centuries of assumptions that 
separated the white European from the black slave, establishing societal expectations by 
skin color for decades to come (Skidmore 1972, 4).   
Contrary to ideas of race in the United States, which can be attributed to its 
attitudes towards slaves and treatment of African-descended peoples throughout time, 
race in Brazil is a continuum.  Where U.S. policy and law was premised on a binary race 
distinction and outlawed racial mixing, Brazil defaulted to the common practice of 
embranquecimento or “whitening” of the population by government-endorsed racial 
mixing (Skidmore 1972, 4).  To help this, Freyre’s “romanticized depictions” of Brazilian 
history “have allowed Brazilians to take pride in their national past and to valorize the 
country’s history of racial and cultural amalgamation” (Caldwell 2007, 32).  The 
normalization of mixing and increased global fetishization of this “exotic” mixed 
Brazilian identity have allowed for the erasure and continued invisibility of Afro-
Brazilians in social, economic, and political spheres and pushing them to the margins of 
society in each of those aspects – hence the harsh statistics.   
The celebration of mixedness, however, did not pacify the inevitable racist 
assumptions embedded in the system of social classification.  Due to the social 
positioning of Europeans as owners and Africans as slaves in the colonial period, it 
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followed that whiteness “was considered to be the natural and inevitable summit of the 
social pyramid” (Skidmore 1972, 4), while blackness was relegated to its base.  Skidmore 
expands on how this “value system” created embranquecimento and how this permeated 
both academic and colloquial ideologies.  On individual terms, “Brazilians have 
deliberately sought sexual partners who are lighter than themselves, hoping by such 
sexual selection to make their children lighter” (4).  On a larger scale, this whitening 
ideology led to anti-black policies in the late nineteenth century such as the intentional 
promotion of European immigration to Brazil’s cities and the suppression of African 
cultural practices in majority-black communities8 (4).   
Population statistics demonstrate the declining proportion of Afro-Brazilians.  A 
figure by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics shows that between 1872 and 
1940, the percent of white Brazilians raised from below 40 percent to well above 609, 
while in that same period of time the percent of black Brazilians fell below 20 percent10.  
Brazilian lawyer and historian F. J. Oliveira Vianna even called this trend the 
“Aryanization” of Brazil, relating the changing demographics of Brazil in the twentieth 
century to Nazi Germany, a particularly extreme case of racial cleansing and white 
                                                
8 Additional evidence of this claim can be found in police reports from the early 1900s which report the 
prohibition of numerous Afro-Brazilian religious cult gatherings.  No specific gatherings are referenced 
here. 
9 Statistics taken from a figure Skidmore uses in his article “Toward a Comparative Analysis of Race 
Relations Since Abolition in Brazil and the United States” from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics. 
10 It must be noted that the source is unclear about whether these statistics were based on self-identification 
or according to any official or national identification forms.  It is very likely that these statistics could be 
inaccurate or falsified as more Brazilians felt the pressure to be white and therefore self-identified as lighter 
than they truly were.  The figure shows that the number of mixed Brazilians similarly decreases from 1872-
1940 to almost only 20 percent of the total population.  If we knew whether this statistic was based on self-
identification or official documents, we would have a better idea about the validity of the numbers and 
perhaps have a better idea of how these changing definitions of race and blackness and mixedness affected 
individual perceptions of self.  Without that information, the figure is still helpful in recognizing the 
severity of embranquecimento in nineteenth and twentieth century Brazil. 
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idealism.  While Oliveira Vianna’s comparison of Brazil to Nazi Germany might seem 
like an exaggeration, the magnitude of whitening was certainly noted by all, from 
politicians to academics to the average Brazilian.  For black Brazilians, 
embranquecimento and Aryanization were not only detrimental to individual perceptions 
of race and self, but they were especially damaging to the survival of the Afro-Brazilian 
community.   
 Socio-economic statistics of Brazil today make it difficult to mask the racial 
inequalities that are alive and well.  In terms of racial disparities, more than seven million 
black and mixed-race Brazilians are functionally illiterate.11  Non-white Brazilians under 
the age of sixteen typically receive an average of 6.7 years of education, while their white 
counterparts receive 8.4.  As for higher education, less than one-third of Afro-Brazilians 
and mulattos gain admission to Brazil’s colleges and universities, and only 4.7 percent 
and 5.3 percent of college graduates in Brazil in 2009 are black or mixed-race, 
respectively (Davis 2014, 75).   
In an attempt to combat and minimize the aforementioned racial inequalities in 
Brazil, policy discussions have taken place in the last twenty years (following the 
democratization of the State), weighing the benefits of requiring quotas in all public 
universities across the country and additional ones for federal jobs.  A handful of 
universities have begun to adopt affirmative action policies in hopes that the access to 
education could be a tool to reduce the poverty of Afro-descendants in Brazil from the 
top down.  These policies have come about because having a college education is crucial 
                                                
11 The author of the article from which I found these statistics includes a useful government definition for 
“functional literacy,” which Brazil uses to describe individuals older than or equal to fifteen years who 
have received less than four years of schooling or have not completed the fourth grade). 
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to the ability to climb the Brazilian socio-economic ladder.  Jorge Werthein, Director of 
the Brazilian Center for Latin American Studies, stated: “Brazil owes a historical debt to 
a huge part of its own population” and “the democratization of higher education” via the 
adaptation of an appropriate affirmative action policy “is one way of paying this debt” 
(Beckman 2014, 19)12. 
Unlike affirmative action in the United States, however, affirmative action in 
Brazil faces a particularly important and complex set of problems due to its racial 
continuum.  Its racial ideology and the national mulatto identity mean “every Brazilian 
has blackness in them.”  The main questions then become: should a policy like 
affirmative action serve Mulattos and Blacks equally?  What constitutes qualification for 
a policy based on race when the color lines are so blurred?   The color gradation in Brazil 
has proven to be problematic in cases such as these, where mixture creates breaks within 
the non-white community.   
Because of lost documentation in the colonial period, it is difficult to trace the 
lineage of black Brazilians all the way back to slavery.  However, since it was so 
common for Whites and Blacks13 to procreate in Brazil, the notion of a “true” or “full” 
Afro-Brazilian is difficult to reconcile.  Just as there is “blackness in all Brazilians” since 
it is a “mixed” nation, then there must also be “whiteness in all Brazilians.”  This 
explains mulatez and the color gradation that is seen today.  If one is to recognize the 
                                                
12 Jorge Werthein’s quote is referenced in Beckman’s book Controversies in Affirmative Action in a 
chapter about the philosophical perspectives on affirmative action.  The author compares legislation that 
created the affirmative action policy in Brazil and criticisms of the policy to those that exist in the United 
States of affirmative action here. 
13 Capitalization of words like white, black, and mulatto throughout the thesis depend on their role in the 
sentence.  According to APA Publication Manual, 6th Edition, 3.14, p. 75, racial and ethnic groups are 
designated by proper nouns and are capitalized; thus, when left alone in the sentence as “Blacks” or 
“Mulattos” or “Whites,” they are capitalized.  Conversely, when used as adjectives of a nationality, 
normally specifying skin tone, they are not capitalized: “black” vs “white” Brazilians.   
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variety in Brazilian blackness due to miscegenation, then one must be able to distinguish 
among people of African, European, or mixed descent which features are more “black” or 
African-influenced and which are more “white” or European-influenced.  Following this, 
one must ask: to what extent do mulattos of lighter skin and with more “white” features 
have an advantage over their darker counterparts?  How does this affect access to 
education, capital, income, etc.?  Additionally, to what extent are they disadvantaged in 
terms of government-funded opportunities and programs such as affirmative action? 
According to a 1907 census in São Carlos, the west-central region of São Paulo 
State, 35.6 percent of white Brazilians identified as farm property owners, 16 percent of 
Mulattos, and 13.5 percent of Blacks (Monsma 2011, 12).  The Estatistica Agricola from 
that year reports only three rural properties owned by black farmers – though that statistic 
might be skewed due to false reporting – and only one of the properties was of substantial 
size.  Alternatively, the census includes two important names of Mulattos who owned 
land: Francisco Antonio Borges and Argeo Vinhas.  The former planted 210,000 coffee 
trees and hired 63 employees who tended to them.  The latter had 18,000 coffee trees 
tended by 24 employees.  Additionally, Vinhas later became one of the incorporators of 
the Magdalena textile factory and one of the investors responsible for introducing electric 
streetcars in São Carlos.  Both of these landowners owed their success to the upward 
social mobility granted to them by marriage with white women.  Vinhas married an 
Italian, and Borges married a white Brazilian and had 7 children by 1907, all of which 
were listed as “white” in the census (Monsma 2011, 11-12).  The history and legend of 
these two Mulattos validate the notion that greater miscegenation with white partners and 
disassociating with poor black Brazilians eventually erases the blackness in Mulattos 
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altogether in just a few generations.  Oracy Nogueira observed that, “...every conquest by 
a [B]lack or [M]ulatto who is able to prevail economically, professionally, or 
intellectually tends to be absorbed in one or two generations by the white group” 
(Nogueira 1998, 182; cited in Monsma 2011, 21).  This abandonment of blackness, as a 
result, allows for the increased ability to acquire greater capital and positions of power.   
The 1907 census also gives information on literacy levels among residents of Sao 
Carlos aged 15 or older.  According to the data, white Brazilians exhibited the highest 
literacy rates among men and women, 61.7 percent and 48.4 percent respectively.  
Literacy rates among Mulattos halve for men at only a 30.5 percent literacy rate and 17.4 
percent for mulatto women.  Unsurprisingly, black Brazilians suffered from the greatest 
disadvantages in accessing education as shown in the statistics: 14.7 percent literacy rate 
among black men and 6.6 percent among black women.  The data also show that black 
children had less access to schools than the children of Mulattos, as the literacy rates for 
sons of Mulattos nearly double those of black Brazilians and quadruple those for 
daughters of black Brazilians (Monsma 2011, 17).  
Despite an obvious discrepancy in the quality of lower education for white and 
non-white Brazilians, the 1907 census data reveals a notable divergence in statistics for 
black and mulatto children.  There are numerous reasons why non-white students fall 
behind white students: private schools denied non-white students from attending, public 
schools were of lesser quality, racialized violence or bullying or black students in school, 
public school teachers (generally white) believed non-white children were naturally 
“stupid” and did not invest in educating them properly or equally to their white peers 
(Monsma 2011, 18-19).  Additionally, children exposed to written literature early on are 
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more likely to learn more easily than others (18).  Therefore, the literacy of their parents 
is an important factor.  At the time that these statistics were recorded, the parents of black 
school children were either freed slaves or were the children of slaves who were 
themselves illiterate as a consequence of slavery.  Miscegenation allowed for a 
disturbance in that unfortunate cycle of illiteracy.  With one white parent (assuming that 
parent was literate), the mulatto child was more likely to be exposed to written material at 
an early age, and therefore grasped the concept faster and better than their black 
classmates.   
Studies show that setbacks so early on in a child’s education process tend to keep 
them behind throughout, often leading to dropout rates even before reaching secondary 
school.  While the aforementioned statistics shown are over a century old, the fact still 
holds that Afro-Brazilians experience greater difficulty accessing a quality education 
(Monsma 2011, 19).  This reality not only distinguishes white from non-white 
performance in higher education, but also has the ability to create a distinction between 
black and mulatto success in high school and higher education.  This is a crucial aspect of 
the debates about affirmative action in Brazil today.   
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Chapter III: Affirmative Action Policies in Brazil 
 
The University of Brasilia (UnB), one of the best federal public universities in 
Brazil, was the first to write an affirmative action policy in Brazil in July 2004 that would 
designate 20 percent of its seats for the incoming class to Blacks and other 
underrepresented groups (Davis 2014, 77).  The objectives of the policy were as follows: 
“to fight racial inequalities, compensate for historical injustices, contribute to the 
diversity of experiences and perspectives on campus, and raise understanding of what it 
means to be black in Brazil” (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 9).  Quota applicants 
must take and pass a department-specific UnB entrance exam called the vestibular, self-
identify as negro (for whom 20 percent of the admissions slots in each department are 
reserved), and attend an interview at the specific department within UnB that verifies that 
they are “black enough” to qualify in order to prevent racial misrepresentation.  Once 
accepted and upon matriculation, the university offers an array of programs to help black 
students adjust and to reinforce and foster positivity in Brazilian blackness, including 
peer tutoring, a space for quota students to study and socialize, and lectures and events 
that highlight the value of black Brazilians in society (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 
9).   
Shortly after, in 2004, the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR) implemented the 
“Action Plan for Racial and Social Inclusion,” formally titled Resolution 37/04-COUN, 
which created three categories of quotas to be implemented as part of the selection 
process.  It required the prioritization of “students of African descent, candidates coming 
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from public high schools, and indigenous students resident in Brazil” in the admissions 
process, as well as set out measures “to ensure that those who entered would be able to 
complete their courses” (Bevilaqua 2015, 197).   
Modeled after those that preceded it, the Federal University of Rio Grande de Sul 
also implemented a form of affirmative action prior to its official institutionalization by 
the state, which designated thirty percent of its seats for the incoming class to students 
applying from public high schools, with fifty percent of those seats “solely designated for 
self-declared afro-descendants” (Davis 2014, 78).  Many universities began to follow 
suit. 
The Supreme Court of Brazil (formerly known as the Supreme Federal Tribunal, 
or STF) voted unanimously in favor of the UnB’s and many other universities’ 
affirmative action policies, deeming them completely constitutional.  When the Justices 
were interviewed, their reasons for supporting the policies varied from comparisons to 
the United States’ model to citations of a “constitutional duty to correct the wrongs of 
past discrimination and a state responsibility to effectively implement the constitutional 
principle of equality or isonomia14 by demolishing institutional barriers to education, 
which has caused an educational deficit among [B]lacks” (Davis 2014, 77). 
President “Lula” da Silva (term 2003-10) was in office during all of these changes 
in universities’ attitudes towards fair and equal admissions.  Regarding the quotas, da 
Silva said, “it’s important, at least for a span of time, to guarantee that the [B]lacks in 
Brazilian society can make up for lost time” (Romero 2012, par. 12).  Brazilian 
government officials started to follow the shift, and on August 29, 2012, President Dilma 
                                                
14 Ancient Greek writers used “isonomia” to refer to popular government.  However, Jurlandia 
(www.jurlandia.org) defines “isonomia” as equal liberty, justice, and sovereignty under law. 
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Rousseff enacted the “Law of Social Quotas”15, which contains a number of important 
initiatives by Rousseff’s cabinet, two of the articles state the following: 
Article 1: Federal institutions of higher education linked to the Ministry of 
Education will reserve in each selective class for undergraduate admissions at 
least 50% of its seats for students who have completed high school in public 
schools. 
Article 3: In each federal institution of higher education, those vacancies 
referenced in Article 1 of this Law shall be filled by self-declared pretos, pardos, 
and indígenas16 and persons with disabilities,  under the law, in proportion to the 
total vacancies at minimum equal to the respective proportion of pretos, pardos, 
and indígenas and persons with disabilities of the population of the area in which 
the university is located according to the most recent census by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).17  (Presidência da República Casa 
Civil, 29 Aug 2012) 
According to the law, Brazil’s 59 federal universities were given just four years to ensure 
that half of the incoming students per year are from public schools “with half of these 
seats partly saved for low-income families (regardless of race) and for those who declare 
themselves as black, mixed, or indigenous with respect to demographic data” (Davis 
2014, 76).  Luiza Bairros, the minister of Brazil’s Secretariat for Policies to Promote 
                                                
15 Officially numerated as Law 12.711. 
16 I chose to keep the original preto/pardo/indigena phrasing instead of their English translations in order 
to maintain the same meaning, as “Blacks/Mixed/Indigenous” might mean different things for different 
readers depending on their background and ideas of race from their own home countries and ideologies. 
17 Translated and paraphrased from the following website containing the original law, written in 
Portuguese: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12711.htm. 
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Racial Equality, said of the law that “officials expected the number of black students 
admitted to these universities to climb to 56,000 from 8,700” (Romero 2012, par. 9).   
Added in 2014 under the Law of Social Quotas was the requirement that 20 
percent of all government vacancies in the public sector must be reserved for self-
identifying Mulattos or Afro-Brazilians (Telesur 2016, “Brazil Commission to Judge 
Darkness of State Officials' Skin”).  Prior to her impeachment, Rousseff – who herself 
identifies as being of mixed heritage – indicated that combating racial inequalities was 
important to her presidential agenda, and her successor, Michel Temer, confirmed the 
same promise to Brazilians.  Thus, Brazil’s government has displayed a commitment to 
help black Brazilians, but how do these policies play out in reality, and how do they 
affect the way Afro-Brazilians see themselves and the way in which others see them? 
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Identity Theory: Self and Group Identification 
The key to these policies is self-identification.  Extensive research has been done 
on social identity theory and inter- and outer-group behavior that is extremely relevant to 
race issues, including policies like affirmative action and their effects on general attitudes 
towards racial difference.  Tajfel and Turner proposed a theory of three cognitive 
processes relevant to a person’s identification with an in-group and attitudes toward out-
groups.  First, they describe the distinction between two extremes of social behavior as 
the “interaction between two or more individuals that is fully determined by their 
interpersonal relationships and individual characteristics, and not at all affected by 
various social groups or categories to which they respectively belong,” and one that 
“consists of interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) that 
are fully determined by their respective memberships in various social groups or 
categories, and not at all affected by the interindividual personal relationships between 
the people involved” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 8).  They then provide the circumstances 
by which people determine their group membership in the following order: 
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Source: http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/psychology/social/social_identity_theory.html, Accessed: 
02/22/2016 
 
Both the in-group and the out-group dynamics are relevant to the understanding of 
the implications of affirmative action policies because the “favorability” characteristic 
shown in the chart has an important effect on the individual’s choice whether to identify 
with a group.  Tajfel and Turner define the “group” as “a collection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social 
consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership in it” (Tajfel and 
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Turner 1986, 15).  This evaluation of the favorability of the in-group with respect to the 
relevant out-groups is key.  According to Tajfel and Turner, group dynamics function 
under the belief that competition exists, and when it does, one of the groups must be the 
“winner” and another the “loser”.  Therefore, there exists a group that is perceived as 
superior over the others by comparison.  An individual’s acceptance of this stratification 
with either the superior or inferior groups is relative to their experiences.  Some groups, 
particularly those that are societally better off (economically, socially, etc.) tend to accept 
the stratification on the basis of ethnocentrism18, while individuals of inferior groups 
“often seem to internalize a wider social evaluation of themselves as ‘inferior’ or ‘second 
class’” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 11).  This negative evaluation can either create a sense 
of self-degradation (negative social identity) or it can intensify its antagonism toward the 
high-status out-group on the basis of inequality and victimization.  This is where race 
comes into play.   
Tajfel and Turner expand on two social and behavioral continua associated with 
the interpersonal-intergroup continuum: social mobility and social change.  These exist 
on opposite sides of the spectrum that describes beliefs of the nature and role of the 
relationships among groups in society.  The first of these, social mobility, is the belief 
that one’s individual role in society is “flexible and permeable,” so that if group members 
are dissatisfied with the conditions into which they were born specifically according to 
their social group or category, “it is possible for them (be it through talent, hard work, 
good luck, or whatever other means) to move individually into another group that suits 
them better” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 9).  Members, therefore, completely separate 
                                                
18 Ethnocentrism can be defined as the evaluation of another or other cultures according to preconceptions 
based on the standards and customs of one’s own culture. 
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themselves from their original group, elevating into another group whose conditions are 
more favorable.  This has been termed “evolutionary individualism,” and it is the 
underlying belief that supports the “American Dream”19 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the social change theory entails the belief 
that groups are separated in society by a marked stratification, such that if an individual is 
dissatisfied with the conditions of their social category, it is very difficult if not 
impossible to disassociate with that unfavorable social identity.   
In reality, neither end of the continuum is completely possible.  There are 
exceptions on both sides.  Climbing the social ladder is possible, but people do not 
necessarily have to abandon every aspect of their previous being to attain that success.  In 
fact, certain characteristics cannot change, such as physical characteristics like skin color, 
height, and so on.  A young Afro-Brazilian might attain an education, graduate with 
honors, and move on to be an executive at a large company, but the people around him 
might still impose certain expectations of him based solely on his skin color and how 
someone like him is supposed to function in Brazilian society.  Thus, these barriers are 
partly traversable, disproving the complete validity of the social change theory, but they 
are ones that make social mobility less smooth. 
Both the social mobility and the social change theories accept that a status quo 
exists; that between social groups, one is perceived as better than another; and that some 
aspects of those groups are unchangeable.  These theories also require that the inferior 
group maintains a negative self-image so that individuals do seek to escape the conditions 
                                                
19 In the definition of the “American Dream” by James Truslow Adams in 1931, "life should be better and 
richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement" regardless of 
social class or circumstances of birth. 
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that they are handed by association with the group.  These theories, however, fail to 
account for cases when the inferior group reevaluates and changes its social identity to 
one that is more favorable, both in-group and externally. 
As they relate to race and gender, specialist Sara Ahmed argues the difference 
between identity and identification: 
We no longer can assume that the subject simply ‘has’ an identity, in the form of 
a properly demarcated place of belonging.  Rather, what is required is an analysis 
of the processes and structures of identification – both psychic and social – 
whereby identities come to be seen as such places of belonging.  By shifting the 
analysis in this way, both race and gender can be theorized not as fixed and stable 
‘essences’ but as construction-in-process where meanings are negotiated and re-
negotiated in the form of antagonistic relations of power. (Ahmed 1997, 157, as 
quoted by Caldwell 2007, 128)  
Ahmed makes a distinction between identity, which is prescribed, and identification that 
is processual and more personal as it focuses on how the subject develops an individual 
sense of belonging.  According to Ahmed, such ideas as race and gender are thus 
“constructed in and through processes of identification” (128).   
Higher education in Brazil is an opportunity for individual social mobility.  
Affirmative action policies aid in removing the sanctions to upward social mobility, but 
this generally happens on an individual level when one essentially dissociates oneself 
from his or her group for personal gain as they see fit.  In line with this theory, many 
black Brazilians have found success by their own means, following the “American 
Dream” model and serving as an exception to the stereotype.  In recent years, however, 
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there have been efforts by many organizations to improve and change social perceptions 
of all black Brazilians.  
 
32 
 
 
Applying Identification Theory to Brazil & Movements 
 
Caldwell uses Sara Ahmed’s argument to show how the process of identity 
formation is crucial for black Brazilians to come to terms with their blackness.  The three 
participants in her study reported to have benefitted from “macro-level discursive 
struggles over the meaning of blackness,” which helped them to strengthen their own 
black racial identities in the Brazilian and transnational context (130).   
Caldwell writes about the Brazilian notion of tornar-se negro/a (becoming 
black20), which “underscores the importance of a processual perspective by 
demonstrating that becoming black is an active process,” and self-identifying as black –
termed negro/a assumido/a – “involves a subjective process of accepting blackness, 
rather than fleeing from it through practices of racial dis-identification” (127).   
Additionally, her results show that “the Brazilian social environment has become 
more amenable  to the valorization of blackness in recent decades” (130).  Other research 
suggests that younger and more-educated Afro-Brazilians are more likely to identify as 
black.  Younger people derive a positive black identity from African-American culture 
and music, and more educated Afro-Brazilians are “more likely to have been exposed to 
black activists rhetoric that promotes a collective black identity than less-educated Afro-
Brazilians” (Mitchell-Walthour and Darity 2015, 321).  The rising number of Afro-
Brazilian organizations and the work and rhetoric of black activists have served as 
                                                
20 Read literally, tornar-se means “to turn oneself,” therefore, “becoming black” is a physical action of 
turning oneself consciously black. 
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positive affirmations of Brazilian blackness and greater understandings of belonging for 
black Brazilians. 
These organizations have a rich heritage.  Black resistance in Brazil reaches far 
back into the country’s history.  One of the most significant weakening forces of the slave 
system in Brazil was known as quilombagem, a term which refers to an “emancipatory” 
(Bergel 2006, 3) rebel movement “organized and led by slaves all across the national 
territory during the enslavement period” (2).  Quilombagens were seen as provocative 
social movements for the time, disrupting the structure of free labor and essentially 
dismantling the Brazilian colonial hierarchy.  Quilombagens functioned in multiple ways 
such as protests, insurrections, and guerrilla warfare, but the most common and important 
of these was the creation of quilombos, or towns where escaped slaves took refuge.  
These towns served as organizational centers for slave resistance attempts in nearby areas 
and “were the locations where [the] socio-cultural changes took place” (3).  Therefore, 
quilombagem was important because it was the first exclusively black organization in 
Brazil’s pre-emancipation history, setting a precedent for later organizations. 
Brazilian black movements started to form in the twentieth century, including the 
Frente Negra Brasileira (FNB - the Black Brazilian Front, 1931-37), Teatro 
Experimental do Negro (TEN - the Black Experimental Theater, 1944), Associação 
Cultural do Negro (ACN - Black Cultural Association, 1954-77), and the Instituto de 
Pesquisa e Cultura Negra (IPCN - Black Culture and Research Institute, 1975-1988).  
Some of these lasted longer than others, but their emergence proved to be important for 
the strength of later organizations.  The Movimento Negro Unificado Contra a 
Discriminação Racial (MNU - Black Unified Movement Against Racial Discrimination, 
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1978) was founded in 1978 as a part of a protest of multiple racial injustices against Afro-
Brazilians across the country.  The MNU is now the most notable civil rights movement 
in Brazil and has offices in all major cities, with departments that focus on different 
issues pertaining to the elimination of racial and class discrimination against black 
Brazilians and building a positive black identity in Brazil (Covin 2006).   
 Today, efforts of exclusively black organizations have taken a less political focus.  
Rio de Janeiro’s Grupo Cultural Afro-Reggae (Afro-Reggae Cultural Group) emphasizes 
“a black identity rooted in the New World experience of cultural mixture and synthesis” 
(Burdick 1998, 138).  Organizations such as Centro de Articulação de Populações 
Marginalizadas (Center for Marginalized Populations-CEAP), Projeto Surfavela, and 
Agentes de Pastoral Negro pride themselves in working exclusively with poor and 
marginalized communities through courses of professionalization, education, pre-
university training, and “conscious-raising” (138).   
Other organizations such as Geledés: Instituto da Mulher Negra (Black Woman’s 
Institute) from São Paolo, Criola in Rio, and Fala Preta! Organização de Mulheres 
Negras (Talk Black! Organization of Black Women)21 are more intersectional and focus 
on the specific concerns of black women, including such issues as reproductive health, 
forced sterilization, and sexual, racial, and domestic violence (Caldwell 2007, 159).  
Regarding the contributions of black women in the intersectional fight for equality in 
Brazil, Caldwell remarks the following: 
                                                
21 Caldwell writes that the names of these organizations are intentional in an attempt to “take back” or 
resignify racial discourses that use criola (Brazilian-born slave/black woman) and preta in a derogative 
way, similar to African Americans’ reclaiming of the term “nigger.” 
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By refusing to remain in their socially ascribed place, black women activists have 
contributed to defining new standards for citizenship and democracy in Brazil.  
Their efforts have involved the claiming of new rights and the constitution of 
black women as active citizens and social subjects.  Moreover, by claiming their 
rights to full citizenship, black Brazilian women have engaged in the struggle to 
create ‘a multiracial and multicultural society, where difference is taken and lived 
as equality and not as inferiority.’ (176) 
Afro-Brazilian women have contributed significantly to the national conversation about 
the social and political place of black Brazilians.  The intersectional lens under which 
these organizations operate reinforces the need for a new construction of a positive black 
identity and self-representation that is inclusive to both men and women alike22.   
The complication of self-identification is that the individual must feel comfortable 
associating with the group to which they belong and identify.  Efforts to promote a more 
positive image of blackness in Brazil have increased proud black self-declaration 
twofold.  Now, Afro-Brazilians seem to be rejecting negative societal expectations and 
developing a more positive ethnocentric group identity – one in which members are 
emotionally involved and social inequalities and the status quo, both which have 
historically put them down, are questioned and challenged.   
 Being involved in and supporting black social, political, and cultural movements 
across Brazil is considered to be one of the  important aspects of identifying as Afro-
Brazilian.  This is also crucial for potentially qualifying for a quota and convincing 
                                                
22 This is the crux of Caldwell’s argument.  While I would like to delve deeper into the gender dynamics of 
Brazil’s race issue and the role of gender in Brazilian affirmative action, I am limiting that to this small 
section.  I hope to do more research on Afro-Brazilian women in another project later on. 
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administrators of a university or job that one is considered Afro-Brazilian by those 
around them.  The identification theory and history of the organizations and movements 
dedicated to improving black Brazilian identity is important in understanding how 
affirmative action currently functions and to whom it is given in some universities in 
Brazil.   
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Chapter IV: The Policies in Action: Implementation and Cases 
 
The tendency to recognize blackness as a distinct and important identity, where 
historically it was erased, started with the rise in a number of political, cultural, and social 
movements in Brazil aiming to achieve equal rights and a positive Afro-Brazilian image 
for and among black Brazilians.  These efforts have come to fruition in the twenty-first 
century as a number of academic institutions and the federal government have adopted 
affirmative action policies designed to help Afro-Brazilian students achieve a higher 
education and seek better opportunities like those of non-black Brazilians.  Under the 
Law of Social Quotas of 2012, universities and federal departments have a skeleton for 
how the policies should function ideally, but the implementation under the given 
conditioning factors varies from case to case.  This chapter explores two university cases 
that demonstrate the complicated nuances of race relations in Brazil and how the policies 
have functioned in these institutional settings over time since their conception.  The way 
the policies work in reality will inform the suggestions given in the conclusion and the 
future of race policies in Brazil and Latin America as a whole. 
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Case Study 1: University of Brasilia 
As the first university in Brazil to establish a racial quota in 2004, the University 
of Brasilia (UnB) was the “guinea pig” of such programs.   After the initial 
implementation, later policies were modeled and improved based on lessons from the 
past.  That being said, the university’s experiences with the policy and the effects on the 
students informs the larger study of race and inequality in higher education and 
professional institutional spaces.   
Francis and Tannuri-Pianto sought to examine the academic performance of quota 
students and the effect of the quota on secondary school efforts and racial identity.  To do 
this, they conducted 1,000 face-to-face interviews and 2,000 online interviews, creating 
“one of the largest research projects on affirmative action in higher education” (Francis 
and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 3).  By obtaining individual responses from nearly 3,000 
participants, they aggregated a large data set that they believe aptly represents the state of 
UnB’s quota system.   
First, they examined how the quota changed UnB’s racial makeup.  Table 4 shows 
the racial profile of the university before and after the implementation of the quota by 
self-reported race. 
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Source: Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 40 
 
 The table shows that prior to the quota, the university was composed of a student 
body that was 50.5 percent branco, 40.8 percent pardo, 5.3 percent preto, and 3.4 percent 
other.  Following the implementation of the quota, UnB’s branco population decreased 
by 4.3 percent, pardos increased by 1.4, and pretos increased by 3 percent23.  The 
following table examines the racial composition of quota students. 
                                                
23 The table gives individual data from three different years during which the quota was in place, though 
for the sake of this section of the thesis, I chose only to include the average change data.   
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Source: Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 41 
 
 Table 5 shows that initially, quota students were nearly 50 percent pardo and 50 
percent preto, though in the following semesters, pardo students made up the majority of 
quota students and applicants at 77.5 and 68.6 percent of those groups, respectively.  This 
significant increase in pardo quota students means that there was an equal decrease in 
preto students matriculating under the quota program.  Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 
attribute this to an influx of quota applications submitted by “better-qualified pardos” 
(Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 19) who perhaps scored higher than their preto peers 
on the vestibular as a result of a more privileged education history.   
 This information is difficult to analyze, however, firstly because the data is self-
reported, and secondly because racial identity is fluid and endogenous.  In reality, race 
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and privilege intersect at a point called colorism24, and skin tone is in fact an important 
piece of analysis that scholars consider in Brazilian affirmative action cases.  Francis and 
Tannuri-Pianto include histograms of average standardized skin tone scores based on 
ratings of respondent photos25 by a panel of Brazilian reviewers for the semester before 
the quota was implemented and after it was implemented.  The twelve Brazilian photo 
reviewers were instructed to rate the skin tone of subjects in the photos on a scale from 1 
(lightest) to 7 (darkest). The y-axis represents percent of the student body, and the x-axis 
represents skin tone, with lighter tones closer to zero and darker tones to the right.   
                                                
24 Colorism was a term coined in the 1980s that can be defined as discrimination or prejudice based on skin 
color or skin tone.  Generally, in Brazil, people with lighter skin do not suffer from colorism because of the 
societal association of goodness with “whiteness,” while darker-skinned people are assumed to be bad, 
poor, troubled, etc.  because of their skin tone. 
25 Respondents who participated in the face-to-face interviews gave their students identification cards to 
the interviewer who then took a photo of the card.  On each identification card there is a standard photo of 
the student that was taken upon matriculation to the college. 
42 
 
Source: Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 3526 
                                                
26 In the graphs, the X-axis represents skin tone, from fairest at 0 to darker tones as it moves towards 
infinity to the right. Y-axis represents portion of the student body. 
43 
 
 
 In Figure 1, the semester prior to the implementation of the quota system, the 
distribution of skin tones of students is fairly close to the left side of the graph.  
Conversely, the distribution of skin tones in Figure 2 suddenly shifts to the right of the 
graph with a longer tail to the right end of the x-axis.  The data from the histograms 
suggests that in just one year of affirmative action at UnB, the student body is visibly 
more black, or generally darker-skinned than it was prior to the policy.  In fact, the 
average skin tone increases by a large margin, showing that the policy achieved its goal 
of bringing more brown and black students to the university, especially in the initial 
semester of its implementation27.   
 The data from the histograms are compelling because they challenge the self-
reported race information gathered in the percentage tables.  These two sources display 
the difference between one’s outward assumed race and individual perceptions of one’s 
own race.    According to the explicit objectives of UnB’s affirmative action policy, it 
was primarily created for negros28.  Provided the difficulty of admission to public 
universities in Brazil, in addition to the benefits the quota program provides for black 
students after matriculation, there is an understandably substantial increase in incentive to 
apply under a quota.  This is especially true for students “at the margin” (Francis and 
Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 26), i.e. pardos and others of intermediate skin tones.  Therefore, 
quotas based on race might influence those in the middle of the racial continuum to 
consider themselves black when they may not have done so prior to college applications. 
                                                
27 They share that in the data from the following couple years the right tale thins relative to the distribution 
of 2-2004, but the change is still significant compared to before the policy.   
28 It might be important to share here that negro refers to association with one’s blackness.  Terms such as 
preto and pardo refer to skin tone.   
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According to Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, “conditional on race/color and 
socioeconomic status, quota students are about 25 percentage points more likely to 
consider themselves negro.  Being pardo in the post-quota era raises the likelihood of 
self-identifying as negro by almost 7 percentage points, an effect which is roughly 50% 
of the sample average for pardos” (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2012, 27).  A student 
survey reported more students at the margin – particularly those who identify as mulatto 
or pardo – are claiming their blackness following the quota program (10), and being a 
quota scholar at UnB “raises the likelihood that a student considers him or herself black 
by about 20 percentage points” (29).  
Francis and Tannuri-Pianto provide another measure for change in self-reported 
race in their second article (2013).  Table 6 presents distributions of self-reported race in 
quintiles by skin tone (based on skin tone from matriculation pictures) for the pre- and 
post-quota implementation29. 
                                                
29 In the table, the lightest quintile indicates the lowest 20 percent of average standardized scores by the 
Brazilian photo reviewers (who rated photos from one to seven indicating lightest to darkest skin tones of 
each participant), the next quintile is the next 20 percent, etc. 
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Source: Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013, 745 
 
The table illustrates marked changes in self-reported race before and after the 
implementation of the quota.  There is a general pattern of “whitening” in the lightest and 
third lightest quintiles.  Particularly, in the lightest quintile, there is an increase self-
identification as branco from 78.3 percent pre-quota to 86.1 post-quota.   
Additionally, and perhaps most interesting, are the changes demonstrated in the 
third quintile.  Self-identification of individuals in the third quintile who identify as 
branco increased from 34.9 percent pre-quota to 47.9 percent post-quota; individuals who 
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identify as pardo decreased from 53.6 percent pre-quota to 44.8 percent post-quota; and 
individuals who identify as preto decreased from 4.2 percent of third-quintile individuals 
pre-quota to 1.1 percent post-quota. 
This whitening is paradoxical and seemingly disproves the hypothesis that 
students are more likely to identify with their blackness following the implementation of 
the quota at UnB.  A later section, examines how lighter-skinned Brazilians responded to 
quota policies implemented in universities and federal jobs.  It is likely that while 
students who qualify for the racial quotas sympathize more with their blackness and thus 
change their self-identification (branco to pardo / pardo to preto), those who are “not 
black enough” to qualify for the quota might feel rejected and thus start to identify as 
whiter than before.   
The data also demonstrate a pattern of “darkening” in the final two quintiles.  The 
number of students in the fourth quintile who identify as branco decreases from 34.9 to 
25.7 percent post-quota implementation, while those who identify as pardo increases by 
nearly ten percentage points.  In the final (darkest) quintile, those who identify as branco 
decrease from 13.9 to 0.9 percent; those who identify as pardo increase from 50.1 to 53.3 
percent; and those who identify as preto increase from 27 to 44.7 percent following the 
implementation of the racial quota.   
These results are expected, since quota students are encouraged to participate in 
programming designed to “foster investments in negro identity” (Francis and Tannuri-
Pianto 2013, 745).  Due to these programs, it is likely that students are more willing to 
come to terms with their blackness, even more so if they did before.  The data prove that. 
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One of the major difficulties of affirmative action programs is determining to 
what extent this change in self-identification is accurate.  The Economist (2013) 
interpreted another article by Francis and Tannuri-Pianto in which they found that “some 
light-skinned mixed-race applicants to UnB … thought of themselves as white but 
described themselves as mixed-race to increase their chances of getting in … Some later 
reverted to a white identity” (Economist 2013, par. 10).   
For this reason, UnB implemented the interview process, through which a 
representative from the applicant’s department tries to determine whether the applicant is 
“black enough” to qualify for the quota.  Interviews consisted of a number of topics, 
including “family background, pre-university education, university admissions, university 
education, employment, expectations, self-identified race” (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 
2013, 736), as well as phenotypical features, which were determined by the photos that 
interviewers took of interviewee’s identification cards.  Combining all of this 
information, interviewers and admissions officers decided whom they deemed most 
worthy or most likely to benefit from the quota program.   
This is a controversial conversation in Brazil right now.  A very recent article 
released by Foreign Policy magazine quotes a few Brazilians with their opinions on the 
issue of racial quotas and misrepresentation.  In particular, Mailson Santiago, a history 
major at the Federal University of Pelotas and an active member of the student activist 
group Setorial Negro, said, “These spots are for people who are phenotypically black. … 
It’s not for people with black grandmothers” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 6).  He was asserting 
that the quota ought to be for individuals who have a “black phenotype” and are thus 
marginalized for their appearance and suffer from colorism, rather than individuals who 
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feel that they deserve reciprocity because there are black individuals in their ancestry.  
This contradicts the argument activists and policy-makers were making two decades ago 
before there was national talk about the creation of a racial quota, which seemed to say 
that any Afrodescendiente was deserving of official recognition and assistance by the 
State. 
This is the current dilemma of universities across Brazil: finding ways to sincerely 
remedy its historically inherent inequality.  UnB, the first to implement, now has about 
thirteen years of experience with racial quotas.  Three years ago, a seminar titled “10 
Anos de Cotas na UnB: memória e reflexão” (10 Years of Quotas in UnB: memory and 
reflection) hosted a number of important figures in the community and policy-makers to 
reflect on the policy over the years.  They determined that if not for racial quotas, UnB 
“would have 71.5% fewer black students in the last decade,” which to those in attendance 
was only “proof that the policy statement of the institution worked and came to include a 
portion of the population that has been discriminated against and excluded from high 
education” (Pompeu 2014, par. 1).    
They also found that quota students were performing outstandingly in the 
classroom.  In 2009, quota students performed better than their non-quota classmates with 
an average índice de rendimento acadêmico (IRA or academic performance index) of 3.1 
and 2.9 (Pompeu 2014, par. 1), respectively, and this was not an isolated incident.  These 
statistics help to discredit myths raised by critics of the Brazilian affirmative action 
policy about the falling quality of universities with greater enrollment by pardo and preto 
students through the quotas.   
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In addition to improving performance of quota students, the committee reflected 
on out-of-the-classroom progress.  Professor José Jorge de Carvalho, who proposed the 
first quotas plan in 2004, explained: “Inside UnB, the changing profile of students is 
remarkable, and racial segregation, which has always been the mark of Brazilian 
universities, decreased significantly with the increase in the number of black and 
indigenous students” (Pompeu 2014, par. 4).  Ivan Camargo, the dean of UnB, celebrated 
the school’s trajectory and its influence on institutions across Brazil, but not without an 
evaluation of existing issues and encouraging a continuation of detailed and 
comprehensive assessments on how to best serve the communities of interest for the 
policy. 
The university unanimously voted on the advancement of the policy.  To those in 
attendance at the seminar, the university has thus far completed its goal.  Natália 
Machado, an anthropologist and affirmative action student at UnB, claimed: “The 
function of racial quotas is to cease from existing or reducing discrimination.  The role of 
society is to work to make this happen as quickly as possible” (Pompeu 2014, par. 5).  
Thus, it should be of primary concern that UnB’s policy fulfills this initiative.   
For Brazil, UnB was the path-maker of racial quotas, and other universities 
quickly followed its example but with their own touches to the policy.  The ambiguity of 
its implementation varies from case to case, such as the interviews of UnB.  Other cases, 
such as the University of Paraná, have their own complications.  The following section 
will explore the implementation process of racial quotas at the University of Paraná and 
the ways in which the university has changed as it has become more integrated.    
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Case Study 2: Federal University of Paraná 
In its first active year, the Federal University of Paraná’s (UFPR) quota policy 
Resolution 37/04-COUN was revised by what is known as the Public Notice 01/2004, 
issued by the Entrance Exams Center (Núcleo de Concursos: NC), that corrected a few 
small details that the original policy should have contained, and instituted regulations for 
the implementation of the quota policy and the 2005 entrance exam.  One article from the 
Public Notice provided that in addition to the standard academic documents required for 
registration of the successful exam candidates, “the students selected for the places 
reserved for Afrodescendientes were required to present ‘a declaration in their own 
writing [...] that the candidate belongs to the black [preto] or brown [pardo] group, as 
used in the IGBE’s Official Census, and that he or she is so recognized by society and 
possess phenotypical traits that identify him or her with the black type [tipo negro30]31’” 
(Public Notice 01/2004-NC, Article 69, quoted by Bevilaqua 2015, 202).  Therefore, the 
Public Notice instituted a new criterion for quota selection, in addition to the prior 
documentation; the added criterion is a letter from each applicant to assert public 
perceptions of that quota applicant instead of solely depending on self-identification.   
Additionally, a second new article in the Public Notice indicated the creation of a 
committee, appointed by a rector, that would be responsible for the analysis and selection 
of candidates applying for quota positions under the “racial inclusion” policy (Public 
                                                
30 The italics are in the Bevilaqua quotation. 
31 Bevilaqua makes sure to clarify in the footnotes that “tipo negro” is not a term that is used in the census; 
rather, it is an identity employed in the political arena to include all those that identify themselves as either 
preto or pardo in the official census.  According to her definition, it seems to be a more general term used 
colloquially to include all black and brown people in Brazil. 
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Notice 01/2004-NC, Article 70).  Members of this committee would not only review the 
documentation of successful exam candidates, but they would also evaluate the letters 
written by applicants essentially to prove their blackness.  The university received 
widespread criticism for the evaluation of its afrodescendiente applicants.  The following 
statistics will show why the first year of this policy’s application required extensive 
revision. 
Nearly 43,900 candidates competed for 4,144 total places during the 2005 
entrance exam.  In order to comply with the newly allocated spots designated by the 
Action Plan, 20 percent of those places were reserved for Afrodescendientes and another 
20 percent for students coming from public high schools, meaning that there were 831 
spaces available for students applying under either quota program.  Nearly 13,800 
candidates applied for affirmative action for public school students, and 2,370 applied for 
affirmative action for Afro-Brazilians.  Of the applicants from the public school pool, 930 
candidates were approved to register: 831 of those registered under the public school 
quota while the remaining 99 achieved high enough scores to register “in the general 
competition” (Bevilaqua 2015, 203).  Among those who applied for the places allocated 
for Afrodescendientes, only 573 were approved to register, leaving 258 places unfilled.  
Thus, fewer black Brazilian students attended UFPR in 2005 – fewer than expected, and 
fewer than intended with the creation of the affirmative action policy. 
As one can imagine, this stirred a controversy.  According to local press, 
information at the time reported that “the committee responsible for evaluating the ‘self-
declaration of racial group’ rejected the academic registration of 127 of the 573 classified 
candidates” (Bevilaqua 2015, 204), more than 20 percent of the total.  Ultimately, 33 
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candidates were “unable to complete their matriculation, allegedly for failing to present 
‘a black racial phenotype’” (204), reducing the final quota class 540 students in total32.    
Universities across Brazil, since the start of the policies’ implementation, have 
received criticism from both the Right and the Left.  The Right detests the existence of a 
racial quota completely, and when situations arise like the inability to fill seats at UFPR 
or quota students receiving low grades once matriculated, their criticisms appear to be 
validated.  On the Left, due to the openly public release of quota student names, 
universities receive criticism that the programs are not reaching “the right students” – that 
the students are too white to qualify for the program, as Mailson Santiago from the 
Federal University of Pelotas said about “[this policy] is not for people with black 
grandmothers” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 6).  Universities find themselves in a difficult 
place, and in order to confront these criticisms, it is important to institutionalize an 
objective process for selecting candidates for the quota. 
In order to institutionalize the affirmative action policy at UFPR, steps were taken 
to clarify its implementation.  However, instead of working to improve the policy itself, 
these steps did the exact opposite, making it even more difficult for black students to 
apply and gain admission under the quota policy due to its stricter conditions.  As a 
result, the Action Plan went under numerous periods of revision.   
A University Council (COUN) in April of 2007 evaluated the Action Plan as it 
stood thus far, reporting the following important information.  First, the Standing 
Committee for Evaluating and Monitoring the Action Plan reported a “significant 
                                                
32 Bevilaqua (2015, 204) reports that information about the composition of the committee for the first year, 
the criteria and procedures adopted are inaccessible and therefore cannot be used to draw conclusions about 
the resulting matriculation rates for black Brazilians that year.   
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increase in the racial diversity of the approved candidates” to the entrance exam with the 
implementation of the racial quota, though Bevilaqua (2015, 210) notes that it is still not 
equal to the percentage of pardos and pretos in the state of Paraná.  Secondly, they 
pointed out how social quotas (for public school students) “does not guarantee racial 
diversity”.  Finally, the president of the committee highlighted the necessity for 
evaluating the selection process in order to fully achieve the policy’s initial goals. 
In May 2005, Resolution 27/05-CEPE sought to examine the regulations for the 
selection process for quota students to undergraduate courses.  Its two main features 
were: a) “the redefinition of the beneficiaries of the racial inclusion places, switched from 
IBGE’s33 classificatory categories to the candidate’s physical attributes;” and b) “the 
effective removal of the self-declaration principle by the designation of a committee with 
the authority to decide whether the candidate’s attributes matched the requirements set by 
the (new) regulation[s]” (Bevilaqua 2015, 205).   
There was a second session in May 2007, two years later, to vote on the official 
amendments to the resolution.  The resulting Action Plan, titled Resolution 17/07-COUN, 
features three main points: 
a) “The redefinition of the intended beneficiaries of the racial quotas as 
‘black [preto] or brown [pardo] candidates, who possess phenotypical 
traits that characterize them as belonging to the black racial group [grupo 
racial negro]’” (Article 1, Paragraph 1, as cited by Bevilaqua 2015, 210-
11); 
                                                
33 IBGE is the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, or the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics 
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b) “The appointment of a committee responsible for verifying that the 
approved candidates match this definition, called the ‘Self-Declaration 
Validation and Orientation Committee’” (Article 1, Paragraph 3, 211); and 
c) “The transfer of the places remaining from one quota category to another 
before its occupation by candidates from the general competition” (Article 
2, Sole Paragraph, 211). 
The amendments change and clarify crucial points in the Action Plan after a few years of 
trial and tribulation.  The first of these seeks to clarify the purpose of the Action Plan, in 
reaction to Mailson Santiago and a number of other activists who have criticized the 
subjectivity of “qualifying” and to whom the quota places are given.  Rather than 
prioritizing all students of alleged African descent, as enumerated by the original policy, 
the amendment requires that the process prioritize students with physical attributes that 
prove African descent.  The second amendment calls for the creation of a committee to 
“legitimize the decision and the process” (Bevilaqua 2015, 210).  A committee then has 
the authority to judge the physical attributes of the quota candidates to decide whether 
they qualify, based on phenotype, for the benefits awarded by the affirmative action 
policy.  The final amendment, found in Article 2, directly attempts to remedy the 
undesirable results of the racial quota implementation in its first few years when too few 
seats were filled as a result of discrepancies in the evaluation process.   
Once again, the UFPR policy underwent a wave of change with the local 
regulation of the Law of Social Quotas (Law 12.711) passed in the National Congress 
under Rousseff’s tenure in 2012.  In general, the federal law required that universities set 
aside 50 percent of places at their schools for students from public schools.  Within those 
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places, seats are specifically allocated for ‘self-declared’ black, brown and indigenous 
candidates in a proportion equal to their percentage of the population of the state in which 
the institution is located (Bevilaqua 2015, 216).  Thus, with the implementation and 
merging of the Quotas Law and the Action Plan, UFPR saw no further purpose of the 
‘Self-Declaration Verification Committee’ and issued its dissolution.  Additionally, 
because of UFPR’s strong standing policy reserving nearly 40 percent of its places for 
affirmative action policies, only a ten percent change was necessary for compliance with 
the minimum required by the federal law.   
The local regulation of the Quotas Law did, however, change the quantity of 
UFPR quota seats for pardo and preto students based solely on race before and after the 
federal law.  The following is a statistical breakdown of how the law functions for UFPR: 
The potential reduction in the number of places for ethnic-racial inclusion results 
from the successive application of percentages on percentages. Considering the 
places as a whole, 50% are reserved to students from public schools and 50% for 
general competition. Of the reserved places, 50% (i.e. 25% of the total) are 
allocated to students with an income below the limit established by the law. The 
percentage calculated by the IBGE census (28.51%) is then applied to this figure, 
which results in an allocation of 7.12% of the total places to black, brown and 
indigenous students below the income limit set by the legislation. The other 
reserved places (also 25% of the total), distributed according to the same census 
criteria (i.e. 7.12% of the total), are allocated to black, brown and indigenous 
students with an income above the limit set by the legislation. Combining the two 
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categories associated with the self-declaration of colour/ethnicity, we arrive at the 
figure of 14.25% indicated above. (Bevilaqua 2015, 223) 
Bevilaqua’s calculation shows that following the full implementation of the federal quota 
law with its minimum reservation requirements, the outcome limited black and brown 
students’ access to the university.  According to the IGBE census, the true percentage of 
preto and pardo students in the state of Paraná equals 28.51 percent, which is double the 
number of admitted students who are permitted under the combined Action Plan and 
Quota law.  Thus, the full implementation created greater impediments for racial 
inclusion at UFPR.   
Additionally, Bevilaqua’s data reveal the general trajectory and process by which 
racial quotas were eventually absorbed into the quotas allocated to public school students.  
Perhaps because the university was never able to fill its allocated seats specifically for 
black students, and had to transfer those places to qualifying public school students 
anyway (as a result of Article 2 of Resolution 17/07-COUN), the university deemed 
quotas based solely on race (and no other supplementary criteria) unimportant.  While 
this is a result of the federal law as it is written, it is also a conscious decision by the 
university not to address or amend the policy.   
The University of Paraná’s Action Plan for Racial and Social Inclusion (2004) 
sought to help mitigate racial tensions by focusing a part of its affirmative action policy 
on students of African descent so that through this policy, black students would be able to 
access the education that would open up greater opportunities in the long run.  In a 
“mutually generative interplay” (Bevilaqua 2015, 193) of politics and bureaucracy and 
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federal and local laws, the university has actually limited black students’ access to the 
university despite its initial and intended goals.   
Thus, this is a case of failed implementation of affirmative action.  Bevilaqua 
provides a lengthy and insightful ethnographic description of the steps by which UFPR 
changed the image and functionality of affirmative action over ten years.  Additionally, 
while it was perhaps the most well studied case, the inability to fill spots is not special to 
UFPR, as it has proven a common problem of affirmative action attempts in other 
Brazilian universities.  However, UFPR does provide a cautionary tale for what other 
universities should seek to avoid in the interplay of local and federal quota 
implementation.   
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Chapter V: Complications: “Race Fraud” in University Admissions and Federal 
Jobs 
 
Former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio da Silva said in an interview that he 
wholeheartedly supported the movements toward federal-level affirmative action 
policies: “Try finding a black doctor, a black dentist, a black bank manager, and you will 
encounter great difficulty. … It’s important, at least for a span of time, to guarantee that 
the blacks in Brazilian society can make up for lost time” (Romero 2012, par. 12).  Leizer 
Vaz, a black activist and coordinator of NGO Educafro, an organization that seeks to 
open access to education for Afrobrasileiros, said in an interview with NPR: “Only 5 
percent of executives are black in Brazil, politicians, diplomats, all things, so the black 
people don’t access the space of power in my country.  This is the real issue we have” 
(Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 33).   
Here we see that access for black Brazilians is not only limited for higher 
education but additionally for positions of power.  This is why the Law of Social Quotas 
(2014) – the federal law which indicated the prioritization of public school and black and 
indigenous students in university admissions – additionally included the requirement that 
20 percent of all government vacancies in the public sector are reserved for self-
identifying Mulattos or Afro-Brazilians (Telesur 2016, par. 4).   
However, as previous sections have shown, quota programs come with a set of 
nuanced difficulties, especially in a country where miscegenation was the “norm” and a 
near majority of the population can claim ancestry from both Europe and Africa.  
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Therefore, just like with the university cases, applicants to federal positions since the 
implementation of the Quota Law in civil service departments have faced a similar 
process of “qualification” for the affirmative action benefits.   
The following cases demonstrate the ways in which the implementation of the 
affirmative action policies have caused controversies and garnered criticism from the 
Brazilian public.  The first case is a race fraud case in another university, and the second 
is a fraudulent accusation in racial quotas for a federal government job.   
 
 
60 
 
 
Case Study 3: Federal University of Pelotas 
Foreign Policy magazine labeled the situation of Brazilian college campuses in 
2016 a “state of racial vigilance” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 8).  In February, organizations 
across Brazil spoke out against racial fraud within university racial quota groups.  A 
student activist group Coletivo Negrada in Espiritu Santo state reported 28 fraudulent 
students to the Public Prosecutor’s Office.  Across five universities in the northeastern 
state of Bahia, organizations (including a black medical student association titled 
NegreX) called out numerous students for fraudulent identities.  At the Federal 
University of Pelotas (UFPel) in the south, the student activist group Setorial Negro 
turned in 27 names to the University for investigation, and 24 of them were asked to 
leave the school (par. 8).  This was activists’ biggest win in such an attempt that year. 
 Fernando34 was a racial quota recipient in the medical program at UFPel.  He 
identifies as pardo and claims that his family has always struggled with racial 
discrimination: “My grandfather was accused of soiling the family blood” (de Oliveira 
2017, par. 2) after he, a white man, married a black woman.  This family legend defines 
how he sees himself and his social sphere, so when he was applying for schools, he 
decided to apply to the prestigious medical program at UFPel with help from recently 
legislated racial quotas for pardo and preto applicants – like him. 
Following the ousting, a headline article in the weekly magazine CartaCapital 
read “White Students Expelled from University for Defrauding Affirmative Action 
                                                
34 De Oliveira notes that the name “Fernando” is a pseudonym.  Thus, his name will be italicized 
throughout the section to show it is not his real name. 
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System” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 1).  Of the “racial vigilance” at his campus, UFPel 
medical student and black quota recipient Marlon Deleon said, “it divided our program” 
(par. 10), but “there were many of us who believed it was the right thing to do” (par. 11).  
Deleon himself reported a classmate whom he described was “flagrantly white and 
blond” (par. 10) – obviously an unintended recipient of a policy created for black 
Brazilians.   
According to Luana Padilha, another black UFPel medical student and quota 
recipient, there are more white-looking students in her courses after the implementation 
of affirmative action than there were before the policy, which she attributes to the 
students’ “[accessing] the program through racial quotas” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 22).  
Georgina Lima, a professor and head of UFPel’s Center for Affirmative Action and 
Diversity, said: “If you look at a photograph of the incoming medical class, only one of 
the students looks black … and he’s not even Brazilian.  He’s from Africa.” (par. 23). 
Following the drama of 2016, three universities, including UFPel, installed “race 
boards” to inspect future racial quota applicants and avoid racial fraud.  The Ethnicity 
Evaluation Committee of UFPel, comprised of eleven members, was created to address 
this issue.  In order to avoid ambiguity, since the original Quota Law did not provide 
agencies with guidance for doing this, the Public Prosecutor’s Office issued strict 
guidelines for the committee: “Phenotypical characteristics are what should be taken into 
account.  Arguments concerning the race of one’s ancestors are therefore irrelevant” (de 
Oliveira 2017, par. 28).   
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Some labor departments and universities across Brazil took these guidelines one 
step further, creating a criterion for which phenotypical characteristics they were to look 
for in their candidates: 
The Department of Education in Para, Brazil’s blackest state, attempted to fulfill 
the decree with a checklist, which leaked to the press. Among the criteria to be 
scored: Is the job candidate’s nose short, wide and flat? How thick are their lips? 
Are their gums sufficiently purple? What about their lower jaw? Does it protrude 
forward? Candidates were to be awarded points per item, like “hair type” and 
“skull shape.”  (de Oliveira 2017, par. 30) 
The first checklist of its kind in any Brazilian institution, the specific criteria received a 
wide range of responses.  Some felt that these “desired” characteristics were too 
reminiscent of the slave trade, when potential buyers twirled slaves around to check for 
particular characteristics.  Others felt that, unfortunately, these measures were necessary 
steps toward real equity in Brazil: “A person who does not look phenotypically black is 
not the one getting killed by police every 23 minutes. So long as this is how racism 
manifests itself here, we need to ensure that the people taking up admissions spots in 
universities are the ones with these characteristics” (par. 31).  Mirtes Santos, a law 
student and member of Coletivo Negrada, asserted that individuals whose existence has 
always been in danger solely for the color of their skin and curl of their hair are the only 
ones deserving of any institutional reciprocity in the form of racial quotas to universities 
and federal service positions. 
Knowing these criteria, people sought any way to make themselves qualified 
enough for the benefits afforded by the affirmative action policy.  Rogerio Reis, head of 
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the committee at UFPel, said: “People would shave their heads, wear beanies, get a tan.  
Just a series of strategies to turn themselves black” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 24).  He said 
he found himself confused in cases when women came in with darker makeup and would 
have to be convinced by a woman or another person well-versed in makeup abilities that 
the candidate was unfitting for the quota spot. 
While many of these examples are obvious fraudulent attempts by these students 
to pass as something they are not, the committees face more legitimate criticisms.  Luiz 
Paulo Ferreira, a second-semester medical student at UFPel said, “If the law stipulates 
than an applicant’s race should be self-reported, then what right does anyone have to tell 
that person that they’re lying? … How can members of the committee feel particularly 
qualified to make these judgment calls?  And based on what criteria?” (de Oliveira 2017, 
par. 27-8).  Ferreira and his classmate, Kelvin Rodrigues, both identify as pardo, to 
which Rodrigues clarifies, “This issue is not so clear-cut” (par. 26). 
For students like Ferreira, Rodriguez, and Fernando, being pardo comes with its 
own discriminations that they feel requires recognition by way of the policy.  Especially 
for people in that position, where they fit as little in one box as in another, institutional 
denial can be a huge hit to one’s own self-confidence, especially as it relates to how one 
identifies or relates to others. 
Following his expulsion, Fernando reminisced on his interview with the 
evaluation committee, remembering that they asked him how involved he was with any 
black activist movements, to which he replied: “I shouldn’t have to be an activist to be 
considered black.”  He remembered that his interviewers gave him only eight minutes for 
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the interview, and that every interviewer was preto, so “there was no one there that could 
identify with [him]” (de Oliveira 2017, par. 24). 
 The influence of the student movements at universities across Brazil in 2016 
demonstrate the need for affirmative action policy reform.  Numerous passionate students 
at UFPel exposed themselves to influence policymakers to recognize the importance of 
this issue to black students at universities across Brazil.  The next case will show how 
similar changes are being demanded of the quota policy for federal government positions, 
once again isolating pardo students to benefit phenotypically black applicants. 
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Case Study 4: Federal Government Positions 
In September 2016, National Public Radio did a report on Lucas Siqueira, a 
Brazilian man who applied to one of the 30 open positions in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs after receiving an impressive score on his foreign service exam.  In his 
application, as job applications in Brazil always ask, he indicated that he identifies as 
pardo35, which automatically qualified him for federal affirmative action benefits in the 
application process.  He received an offer from the Ministry, and shortly after filling all 
thirty positions, the Ministry released its list of new hires to the public (Garcia-Navarro 
2016).   
Soon, the Ministry began to receive complaints from people claiming that a 
number of the hires – Siqueira in particular – were too “white” and should not have 
qualified for the benefit.  Critics went into Siqueira’s Instagram and Facebook, and “they 
sent his personal photos to the government,” labeling him a “fraud” who was only 
“gaming the system” (Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 8-10).  Receiving enough pressure from 
the public on the issue, the government put Siqueira’s offer on hold and launched an 
investigation by organizing a race committee that was to determine Siqueira’s 
“eligibility” according to the following criteria of parentage, self-identification, and 
phenotypic characteristics.     
                                                
35 It might be important to note that in his interview with NPR, Siqueira said that when he indicated his 
race as pardo, he did not consider the quota system.  “He just put down what he considered himself to be” 
(Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 10), or how he identified himself to others.  NPR writes from this perspective: 
that Siqueira did not have ill intention but rather just reported his race exactly as he saw himself. 
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In response to questions on his racial lineage and how he identifies racially, 
Siqueira said the following: “I consider myself to be a very typical Brazilian and I've 
always been very proud of it.  In my dad's family, my grandfather is black, my 
grandmother has Indian and white roots.  And on my mother's side they are mostly white, 
mostly Portuguese" (Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 5).  Technically, by normal Brazilian 
standards, Siqueira qualified as being pardo for his mixed heritage.   
Conversely, Siqueira had more trouble proving to the panel his authenticity when 
it came to his phenotypic characteristics.  In fact, race tribunals were made mandatory for 
all government jobs following the scandal, such that one state went so far as to “[issue] 
guidelines about how to measure lip size, hair texture and nose width” (Garcia-Navarro 
2016, par. 23).  Based on these criteria, the public36 pointed to the content and photos on 
Siqueira’s social media profiles and deemed him “too white.”  His lawyers encouraged 
him to see seven dermatologists to classify his skin color on the Fitzpatrick scale37, which 
grades skin tone from one to seven (lightest to darkest, respectively).  His results: 
“Apparently on my face I’m a Type 4. Which would be like Jennifer Lopez or Dev Patel, 
Frida Pinto or John Stamos.  On my limbs I would be Type 5, which is Halle Berry, Will 
Smith, Beyoncé and Tiger Woods38” (par. 19).  Siqueira, like many other people, has 
different skin tones on different parts of his body because of exposure to the sun.  With 
these reports, Siqueira attempts to show that his medium-dark skin tone likens him to 
                                                
36 Individual Brazilians (in large numbers) who had spent the time to scour Siqueira’s public media 
profiles, such as Instagram and Facebook. 
37 The Fitzpatrick scale, adapted in the late twentieth century for the use of skin cancer research, …... 
38 Siqueira uses well-known actors and public figures to give readers reference.  For those who do not 
know, Jennifer Lopez, John Stamos, and Dev Patel are all what society would consider “medium-toned,” or 
dark olive/golden brown tones.  Additionally, it’s important to note that Lopez identifies as 
Latina/Hispanic, Patel and Pinto are Indian, and Stamos is white-Anglo.  Halle Berry, Will Smith, Beyoncé 
and Tiger Woods are all what society would consider light-skinned African-Americans and also identify 
themselves as black.   
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other individuals who self-identify as black, asserting that he should also be able to call 
himself pardo39.   
Regarding the controversy, Leizer Vaz said that in Brazil, “skin tone matters more 
than race, because so much of the population is mixed. … Who is more affected by 
racism?  Who has the chance to be more affected by (discrimination)40 in this country?” 
(Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 35-6).  In Leizer Vaz’s opinion, the in-depth analysis of a 
race committee is good because it “[keeps out] white people who intend to make a fraud,” 
and “acts as a deterrent for those who want to take precious government jobs away from 
marginalized groups” (par. 36-7).  He says: “It’s controversial, but the general result is 
good.  Because we are giving a chance for poor black people to access the space of power 
that we never had this in Brazil” (par. 41). 
Because it is an objective fact that people in Brazil (and around the world) 
experience a certain kind of cruel discrimination solely for the color of their skin, 
activists in Brazil are fighting for the colorism argument when it comes to affirmative 
action.  Critics of the current standing policies say that the policies should only be used 
for individuals who look black.  Siqueira does not look particularly black.  He certainly 
has features that prove he is of mixed descent, but that makes him more like the majority 
than the minority.  In order to break up this majority of Brazilians that can claim African 
ancestry in Brazil, policy makers can look to individuals that embody the characteristics 
                                                
39 Also important to remember with this argument that those people to whom he likened himself, who 
identify as black, are able to identify as black in the United States because of the “one drop rule,” which 
makes any person with African ancestry, no matter their racial percentage, a black or African American 
person.  Alternatively, in Brazil the color continuum makes this argument more complicated, and thus 
Siqueira’s argument is flawed in the Brazilian context. 
40 Parenthesis were added by the author of the NPR article, Garcia-Navarro. 
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of their African ancestors and who suffer the daily remnants of the same racist Brazil that 
their ancestors knew.   
Lucas Siqueira says that he understands these racial dynamics in Brazil.  His 
argument lies in the government’s ability to tell a person that he or she is or is not what 
they think they are.  He claims: “I think we are going down a very dangerous path if we 
want to institutionalize these kinds of racial tribunals” (Garcia-Navarro 2016, par. 43).  
The identity theory section of this thesis presents the Tajfel and Turner description of the 
process by which individuals identify themselves: first, people undertake a social 
evaluation of themselves in relation to those around them.  That social identity then 
informs their individual identity, and this personal identity feeds back into the social 
identity.   
Siqueira always identifies himself as pardo because he sees himself like all other 
“typical Brazilians” (par. 5).  Now, as he waits for his case to be resolved, Siqueira 
questions his sense of self.  He is not “black enough” for the benefits newly afforded to 
black and brown Brazilians, but he has never been “white” before.  So Siqueira, like 
many others in his situation, finds himself at a racial crossroads: “not white, not black, 
and now, not embraced by either side” (par. 44).   
 
 
*** 
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Fernando’s case with UFPel and Siqueira’s case with the Brazilian federal 
government both provide compelling perspectives on the affirmative action process for 
individuals who exist in the margins, who are neither branco nor preto.  Their cases 
prove that the policy as it currently stands is especially ambiguous and rather subjective 
for pardos.  Perhaps this complication stems from the public’s broad definition of pardo.  
While branco and preto are fairly easy to determine by phenotype, anyone who does not 
quite fit exactly those expectations is given the label pardo.   
In reality, as the UnB case demonstrates through easy shifts in identity for pardos 
before and after the policy implementation, there are individuals in that middle category 
that can easily claim whiteness or blackness.  But is this fair?  How about the preta 
student who is denied a job because she is “not what [the company is] looking for?”  
What about the young preto adolescent who is shot down for picking something out of 
his pocket on the street?  While a pardo will face more trials than a branco, he will get 
away with much more than a preto.  Especially in Brazil, colorism is the measure by 
which people are defined, and unfortunately, stereotypes are attached to each shade on 
the continuum.   
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Chapter VI: Conclusions & Policy Suggestions 
 
Race has long been used to identify and ultimately separate people by social and 
cultural differences.  Contexts such as education, gender, appearance, and locale also play 
a formative role in shaping racial identity.  This social construct is ultimately 
strengthened by its function within government and non-government institutions.  
Brazil’s history does little to hide its dark path of institutional racial discrimination, from 
nearly 300 years of slavery to modern-day mass genocide of Afro-Brazilians on the 
streets and in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.   
Following the abolition of slavery, miscegenation became a “national duty” (de 
Oliveira 2017, par. 15) to erase da cor do pecado (“the color of sin”) from its national 
identity.  Against the expressed wishes of Brazil’s famed “racial democracy” 
philosophers of the early twentieth century, black Brazilians still exist and make up a 
large portion of the Brazilian population.  In modern-day Brazil, if you are black and do 
not have college degree or a decent job, you are likely to face serious institutional 
discrimination, barring you from a number of opportunities for improving one’s social 
and economic life.   
The supreme court decided that affirmative action was an appropriate “weapon” 
(Economist 2013, par. 8) to fight the legacy of Brazil’s slavery, but after more than ten 
years of racial quotas in universities and federal departments, many Brazilians fear that 
the policy “[collides] head-on with a defining feature of Brazilian identity” (de Oliveira 
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2017, par. 3) – that which celebrates mestiçagem, or “mixedness.”  Others worry that the 
policy is attempting to copy what has been done in the United States.  As a result of the 
nature of the policy, modeled after US incentives, Brazilians are being forced to “choose 
sharp-edged racial identities” in a blurred racial environment, creating tensions “where 
none existed before” (Economist 2013, par. 8).  Today, questions are circulating 
regarding where the lines between races should be drawn, who should draw them, what 
criteria should be used, and exactly whom the policy should serve.  These conversations 
are now engulfing college campuses, the public sector, and Brazilian courts. 
Policymakers disagree on the purpose of affirmative action, which makes it 
difficult to clarify decision criteria that fit every case and please everyone.  The 
weighting of these decisions hinges on the diverging priorities of the policymakers.  The 
majority of Brazilians claim to have o pé na cozinha (a foot in the kitchen)41, even if 
some of those individuals do not look black.  To many, that is what makes Brazilians 
Brazilian.  While it remains important to provide dignity for black identity and Afro-
Brazilians, if this goal is pursued through the qualification process of affirmative action, 
it undermines the effort to reduce discrimination against darker Brazilians.    
The Law of Social Quotas was created to correct the wrongs of past 
discrimination of Afro-Brazilians.  As it stands today, it favors racial self-declaration in 
its prescription.  Whereas Tajfel and Turner’s self-identification theory and the 
application of racial identity expression are important in Brazilian society, self-
identification dependent on ancestry should not be the primary criteria for admission to 
                                                
41 O pé na cozinha (a foot in the kitchen) refers to the inseparability of blackness, whiteness, and racial 
miscegenation in Brazil.  The phrase is used colloquially to refer to the widespread ancestral connection of 
many Brazilians to the “kitchen” through slavery and domestic service. 
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universities and government employment.  It is certainly possible to identify with one’s 
blackness without benefitting from affirmative action.  It is the duty of the State to clarify 
that in its prescription of the policy.  However, given the explicit purpose of the policy 
and the problems of extreme marginalization facing phenotypically black Brazilians, 
prioritization of those members of society should be the main criterion for selecting 
recipients of these racial quotas, despite what seem to be ludacris sets of criteria to 
determine guidelines for “appropriate” phenotype.  Other motivations dilute the policy’s 
imperative of expunging racial discrimination. 
The issue of race is complex in Brazil.  The Brazilian government has had a 
difficult time defining what is “Brazilian blackness.”  For this reason, a decade of 
affirmative action trial and tribulation is reasonable.  However, the process of the policy 
has affected its outcomes in undesirable ways, such that this has caught the attention of 
politicians, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers across the world.  It should be 
the priority of Brazilian policy-makers to clarify the process of implementation for 
affirmative action.  Additionally, it should be made known for whom the policy is 
intended.  Then, the policy can be tilted accordingly in favor of phenotype so that it can 
achieve its intended purpose.  
Furthermore, affirmative action should not be the stopping point for the Brazilian 
government in combating racial inequality.  Programs financing primary and secondary 
education and expanding social welfare should be reprioritized.  Additional social 
programs educating all Brazilians about its history of slavery and racism should be 
created, and platforms for increasing and highlighting black positive identity should 
manifest social platforms accessible to all Brazilians – branco, pardo and preto, alike.  
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Only a comprehensive approach to eliminating racial discrimination will actually make a 
difference.   
Mahatma Gandhi proclaimed that a nation’s greatness is measured by how it 
treats its most marginalized citizens.  In order for Brazil to continue to compete in this 
increasingly globalized and developed world, it must first contest its ever present 
inequalities and work to ensure happiness and the protection of human dignity for all 
Brazilians. 
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